

THE PLATONIC ANALOGY BETWEEN SOCRATES AND ACHILLES: THE REPLACEMENT OF THE HOMERIC MODEL OF BRAVERY (*Apology* 28a3-29c1, *Crito* 43a-44b5)

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It is well-known that Plato, in his early dialogues, invents many literary devices in order to depict Socrates as the true model of virtue. An example of one of these devices can be found in the *Apology* and the *Crito*, where Plato resorts to the analogy between Socrates and Achilles. Before the possibility of death, they must both perform certain deeds that are characterised by bravery and endurance and are in compliance with the values they represent. Thus, the concept of bravery furnishes the occasion for further reflection on the two systems of values that Socrates and Achilles represent. However, where does this analogy cease to be absolute? A closer examination of *Apology* 28a3-29c1 and *Crito* 43a-44b5 shows that the Achillean system of values fails to provide a consistent model of conduct according to which someone's words and deeds are in absolute harmony. On the contrary, the Socratic model, which discloses with absolute consistency the faithful application of its ethical dictates, represents a more consistent, effective and beneficial model for the human: the just deed.

Keywords: Plato, Socrates, bravery, values

ПЛАТОНОВСКАЯ АНАЛОГИЯ МЕЖДУ СОКРАТОМ И АХИЛЛЕСОМ: СМЕНА ГОМЕРОВСКОЙ МОДЕЛИ «ХРАБРОСТИ»

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Хорошо известно, что Платон в своих ранних диалогах, изобретает много литературных приемов для того, чтобы изобразить Сократа в качестве подлинного образца поведения. Пример этого можно найти в «Апологии» и «Критона», где Платон обращается к аналогии между Сократом и Ахиллесом. Перед угрозой смерти они оба совершают определенные поступки, которые характеризуются смелостью и стойкостью, защищая ценности, которые они представляют. Таким образом, понятие храбрости отражает две системы ценностей, которые представляют Сократ и Ахиллес. Однако, где эта аналогия перестает быть справедливой? Внимательное изучение «Апологии» (28a3-29c1) и «Критона» (43A-44b5) показывает, что система ценностей Ахиллеса не может служить моделью для поведения для тех, чьи слова и действия находятся в абсолютной гармонии. Напротив, Сократова модель, которая содержит абсолютную последовательность в применении этических норм, представляет собой более последовательную, эффективную и благотворную модель для деятельности человека.

Introduction

Despite the fact that many scholars have noted the connection between Socrates and Achilles that Plato attempts in many dialogues, no particular attention has been paid to the relationship of the two passages, *Apology* 28a3-29c1 and *Crito* 43a-44b5, which present the literary and philosophical purpose of such a connection in the best way. This article attempts to cover this void in research and its main aim is not only to closely examine the two passages, but also to highlight the way in which they interact, the one completes the meaning of the other, and both consistently present the Platonic literary intention: to replace the Homeric model of bravery with the Socratic one.

Apology 28a3-29c1

The closure of Socrates' apology, through which he tried to confute the accusations against him, is characterised by his presentation as a model of just and virtuous conduct. The complete acceptance of his duties as the representative of the model of virtues that he proposes includes the awareness of the fact that the main reason for his possible conviction will be the envy and slander of the many:

'This will be my undoing, if I am undone, not Meletus or Anytus but the slanders and envy of many people. This has destroyed many other good men and will, I think, continue to do so'. (Grube's translation)¹

The issue of the envy of the many results in the question whether what the public opinion considers as the greatest evil (29a9-b1), namely death, may hinder the successful fulfilment of his duties.

The Socratic reasoning is developed with a clear and definitive description of the indissoluble connection between just (δικαίον) and good (ἀγαθόν). The most important concern of the human that is able to produce-offer benefit, namely to be virtuous (ἀγαθός), and make someone else virtuous too, according to the argumentation of the first sections of the *Apology*, is the performance of a strict elenchus, with the purpose of guaranteeing the just and avoiding the unjust quality of his deeds; at the same time, the elenchus must turn to the assurance of the definition of his deeds as deeds of a good and not wicked man. Socrates defines the main axis for the regulation of human conduct: the just deed and the commitment to the deeds of a good man (ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα). The just deed is connected with the works of a good person, while the unjust deed with those of a wicked person. Therefore, if the good man is the one that provides benefit, the only safe way for him to be characterised as "beneficial" is the performance of just deeds.

The various aspects of the conceptual identification of good and just can be exclusively detected within the framework of the political society, the structure of which is based on the harmonic coexistence of citizens. The result of the promotion of just-good conduct is the simultaneous promotion of the cooperative values against the competitive ones, a gesture of value prioritisation which Socrates repeatedly makes and which he conscientiously serves. The just-good conduct provides benefit at the same time both to the person that performs the just deed and to its receiver, making both the former and the latter just and good. The monitoring of the consistent observance of the aforementioned ideological pattern gains greater value in relation to the evaluation of the possibility of death as an inhibiting factor. In fact, Socrates dictates endurance as the way to deal with the dilemma presented in front of him, a dilemma referring to the election of life, on the one hand, and just conduct, on the other hand. Based on the Socratic ethical system, the selection of just conduct over life is not shameful: this selection constitutes the content of a just and good speech (δικαίος, καλὸς λόγος). On the contrary, every attempt to disdain the just deed with the aim of raising the element of death to the level of the greatest evil is criticised as shameful. As one can easily understand through the thorough examination of the passage, the clearest definition of the Socratic ideological resonance that the use of the critical term "shame" has presupposes and indicates the re-evaluation of the hierarchy of the virtues and values based on which humans define their conduct. A life the priority of which is to guarantee the continuation of life and which ignores the performance of just deeds is shameful. On the other hand, a good life is the one that promotes as an imperative ethical dictate the performance of just deeds, while, at the same time, it understates the importance of the assurance of life with the aim of avoiding death. The commitment to just and virtuous deeds provides the person committed to their performance with bravery, courage and endurance. As it seems,

¹ καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἕανπερ αἰρήῃ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσει, 28a7-b1.

bravery is the patient underestimation of the risk of death with the aim of acting like a just and good man. However, the introduction of the concept of bravery makes it necessary to clarify its conceptual and semantic relationship with the terms described above.

In order to confirm his argumentation that aims at showing that it is shameful for someone to give life top priority, Socrates resorts to the use of an analogical example that derives its theme from the Homeric epics. The argument unfolds in the following stages:

a) the heroes that lost their lives during the Trojan War were brave, defying the possibility of death and remaining committed to the values they served. This is why they are not worth of the characterisation 'paltry' (φαῦλοι); the term 'paltry' (φαῦλος) blames the heroes that have the opposite conduct, namely cowardice, fear of death and search for escape, betrayal of the values praised by the Homeric society;

b) Achilles defied death, in this way giving top priority to the demonstration of bravery with the aim of avoiding a shameful result:

'The son of Thetis, who so despised danger, in comparison with enduring any disgrace'; (Fowler's translation)¹

c) despite his mother's advice that predicted his impending death, he wanted to revenge for Patroclus, with the aim of restoring his fellow's honour:

"My child, if you avenge the death of your comrade, Patroclus, and you kill Hector, you will die yourself, for your death is to follow immediately after Hector's." Hearing this, he despised death and danger and was much more afraid to live a coward who did not avenge his friends'. (Grube's translation)²

The fear of death, cowardice and non-revenge constitute demonstrations of a conduct that prove the Homeric hero 'bad' or 'base' (κακός). On the contrary, the provision of benefit to a friend through the return of the evil one has suffered indicates, according to aristocratic code of values, all those actions that restore the traditional justice (δίκη, 28d2); at the same time, it prevents the characterisation 'ridiculous' (καταγέλαστος) that the sharp criticism of the opinion of others tosses.

Socrates is aware of the Homeric code of values: he accepts the attribution of the term 'paltry' (φαῦλος) to the person that gives top priority to his individual salvation, showing cowardice and a desperate search for escape. The term, equivalent to the term 'bad' (κακός), criticises cowardice and the escape from the place of the acts of war. Therefore, the need for the strict observance of the model of the traditional virtuous man, who proposes bravery as the necessary means of dealing with the risk and avoids any possibility of a shameful deed, seems imperative. Achilles' main goal is the restoration of his fellow's honour. The quality of his deeds is predefined by the dictates that the Homeric society designates for the Homeric 'good' (ἀγαθός) man. A possible deviation from these constitutes shame and disgracefulness. Under this perspective, the fear of death and the subsequent presentation of life as the greatest value, able to hinder the restoration of a dead fellow's honour and, in general, the faithful application of the aristocratic pattern 'to help one's friends and to harm one's enemies' (ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους καὶ βλάπτειν τοὺς ἐχθρούς), constitute demonstrations during which the Homeric good man (ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος) acts as bad, base (κακός); demonstrations that are denounced as shameful, that cause shame, 'disgrace' or 'reproach' (ἐλεγχείη) and render their actor ridiculous.

But why does Socrates resort to this particular analogical argument? Where does their deeper correlation lie? The greatest challenge that may destabilise the validity of the analogical argument lies in the fact that the "virtuous" model of the Homeric world is strongly

¹ ὁ τῆς Θετίδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, 28c3-4.

² ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλω τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῆ-αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος—ὁ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δέισας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, 28c6-d1.

founded on retaliation, while the Socratic apology, as we have learned by now, promotes the just-good conduct which involves the cause of benefit.

First of all, for Socrates, the risk of death lurking in his personal activity is not shameful; the wish to escape death due to cowardice and fear is what is criticised as shameful. Similarly, for Achilles, every attempt to protect his life due to fear is shameful. On the contrary, he chooses death in order to remain with persistence and consistency in the service of the values and the conduct that the Homeric society dictates. This is the point in which the analogy between the two sides is expressed to the ultimate degree: namely, the reference to the feeling of shame. Before the possibility of death, they must both perform certain deeds that are characterised by bravery and endurance and are in compliance with the values they represent. If they do not act in this way, the feeling of shame is inevitably caused.

However, where does this analogy cease to be absolute? Which is the determining difference between the two systems of values that Socrates and Achilles represent? The Platonic *Apology* highlights Socrates' critical disengagement from the Homeric model of values. The features characterising the Socratic good man are different from those that characterise the Homeric one. Socrates defines just deeds as the most important concern of human behaviour, qualitatively specifying the kind of deeds that must be performed with the aim of the citizens' collaboration and the promotion of the cooperative values. On the other hand, within the framework of the Homeric society, the cooperative values in comparison to the competitive ones are proven subsidiary: the Homeric good man's main concern is his honour. The traditional justice (*δίκη*), which clarifies the indisputable limits that befit each person, grants the possibility of wrong deeds – as Socrates defines it – to the Homeric good man, with the aim of enhancing his honour. Under the Socratic teaching, however, justice (*δίκη*) is exclusively incorporated in the productive cause of benefit and the new type of “good deed”. Nevertheless, the problem of the analogy between Socrates and Achilles remains unsolved to a great extent.

For someone to be able to unravel the relationship between the two sides of the analogy, they must try to detect the deeper meaning of the Socratic analogy under the light of the incomplete unity of virtues that invades the previous section of the *Apology* (24b3-28a2). There, the way in which wisdom is connected with temperance, justice, piety and virtue on its whole becomes evident. Achilles' example in the section we examine serves the introduction of bravery in this relationship grid and urges the examination of the new bonds that are created. Achilles constitutes the appropriate model of bravery that can serve Socrates' plan, as the Homeric epics were the text based on which the Greeks of that time were taught writing and reading. Therefore, it is a consistent model of bravery, acceptable by everyone and, thus, any attempt to compare or comparatively examine it with another one becomes functionally possible and dynamically understandable. Achilles' bravery is the starting point, the point of reference for the new model that Socrates wishes to introduce and make comprehensible. However, the citation of the two models of bravery together, under the light of the different values they represent, undermines the consistency of the analogy. The introduction of the Socratic bravery starts from a heroic example, however, serving the system of the Socratic ethics, it seems to destroy its foundations. Thus, he must replace Achilles' model of bravery with a new one. But how will this happen? Through the parallelism between the military field and the philosophical living.

Disregarding the Achillean analogy, Socrates clarifies his view, which is in complete agreement with the truth (28d5). According to the definitive dictates of truth, one must patiently remain at the position he has been called to serve, either this has been defined by himself as a result of his decision on whether this benefits him or not, or by the dictating authority he serves. In the model of bravery that he presents, Socrates proposes endurance and the persistence on one's duty with the exclusive aim of avoiding the shamefulness (*αἰσχρόν*) that the overvaluation of the factor of death involves as a regulatory principle of human conduct.

The Socratic argumentation becomes clearer through the parallelism that it attempts between the military field and the kind of philosophical living that he lives. Transferring his experiences from the military field, the military services and the obedience to his superiors, he makes an interesting parallelism with the philosophical living. Specifically, it is shameful to abandon one's position in the battlefield due to fear and cowardice, which is translated in indiscipline, failure to fulfil one's duties and disobedience to the masters' orders. However, with the word 'terrible' (δεινόν), not only does he criticise the failure to show bravery as a demonstration of his obedience to human masters, but also the failure to show bravery as a demonstration of piety, namely absolute compliance with the godly dictates:

'It would have been a dreadful way to behave, men of Athens, if, at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium, I had, at the risk of death, like anyone else, remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered me, and then, when the god ordered me, as I thought and believed, to live the life of a philosopher, to examine myself and others, I had abandoned my post for fear of death or anything else'. (Grube's translation)¹

At a human level, the demonstration of bravery as a means of dealing with the risk of death is an expression of obedience to one's superiors and personal acceptance of the established relationships of authority. Extending this reasoning to the field of the relationship between humans and gods, the aforementioned necessary precondition becomes even more imperative, because, in this way, the human recognises the dividing line between the human and godly level; he admits the superiority of the godly factor and its power on the human factor; he shows pious conduct. By admitting the superiority of the godly masters in relation to the human ones, Socrates manages to add a godly validation to the necessity of showing bravery while serving the godly dictates. In this way, bravery is presented as a demonstration of piety; and the demonstration of piety, under the light of the Socratic interpretation of the Delphic oracle given to Chaerephon, is presented as encouragement of the patient persistence on the philosophical living of the performance of elenchus. Consequently, the Socratic interpretation of the oracle adds a godly validation to his philosophical activity; it demonstrates bravery as a necessary virtue for someone in order to deal with circumstances that require endurance; it is an expression of pious and just conduct. At the same time, Socrates demonstrates the development of a new grid of relationships that connects the concepts of bravery-piety-temperance. On the other hand, he discloses again the injustice of his referral to trial and the groundlessness of the accusation.

Continuing his remarks, Socrates returns to the definitive element of knowledge, raising multilateral and complicated questions on the way in which it correlates and is integrated in the four-part scheme that we recomposed: bravery – piety – temperance – justice. It should be reminded that the acceptance of the authority of the laws, namely the obedience to the laws, is a sample of temperance, lawfulness and justice: features that provide Socrates with bravery and endurance. Furthermore, the acceptance of the duty to serve god, through the interpretation of the Delphic oracle in a way that validates his philosophical living, is an example of temperance and piety: features that provide the person with bravery. However, in which way is bravery connected to knowledge (σοφία)?

Socrates attempts to answer the question handling the two terms on a single equalising base, with the ultimate aim of proving that the fear of death is unsubstantial. The feeling of fear towards the possibility of death is equated to the conviction of knowledge under conditions of ignorance:

¹ Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῖῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ̄ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾤηθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίπομι τὴν τάξιν, 28d9-29a2.

'To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know'. (Grube's translation)¹

Therefore, ignorance and cowardice interact, forming a strict deterministic framework. Nevertheless, why is the fear of death equal to the pretence of knowledge in an environment of ignorance? 1) the fear of death, namely cowardice, is shameful (αἰσχρόν); 2) fearing death is equal to believing that one knows things he does not know; 3) therefore, the non-awareness of ignorance with regard to death is condemned as shameful and disgraceful. Following the reverse way, we conclude that bravery is the result of the situation in which the human is aware of his ignorance in matters about which he has no knowledge.

Under this light, on the one hand, Socrates fully admits his ignorance in matters concerning death (awareness of ignorance):

'As I have no adequate knowledge of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have'. (Grube's translation)²

On the other hand, he admits that he is aware of what is evil and shameful:

'I do know, however, that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one's superior, be he god or man'. (Grube's translation)³

Therefore, what is the content of Socrates' express claim for knowledge? He claims that he is aware of what is evil (κακόν) and shameful (αἰσχρόν): the terms criticise the performance of injustice and the demonstration of disobedience to one's superior (βελτίων), be he god or man. In his apology, Socrates proved the superiority of justice, which guarantees the collaboration between the citizens and the achievement of the goals of the political community. Moreover, he highlighted the importance of the demonstration of bravery with the aim of dealing with one's duties. Which is the necessary connecting link of the concepts under examination? It lies only in wisdom. The awareness of what is good, which Socrates declares, is the moving force of prudent and temperate conduct, which is expressed as modest behaviour and encourages the observance of the laws that regulate human relationships (justice), as well as those that regulate the relationships between human and gods (piety); at the same time, he indicates the acceptance of the relationships of authority that are imposed by the human and, by extension, the godly laws and, in parallel, the demonstration of bravery when these relationships require so. The aforementioned remarks highlight the importance of knowledge as a coordinating factor of the functional coexistence of the other virtues, at the same time stressing the multilateral significance of the unity of virtues. But is it possible to know what is good?

The careful examination of the passage leads to the following conclusions: Socrates is presented as the advocate of human wisdom, which constitutes the awareness of human ignorance. However, this awareness is the first stage of the way to knowledge that the human must follow. The knowledge of what is good, which Socrates claims to have, arises as a result of the confirmation of the Delphic oracle's content through the application-performance of the elenctic method at the level of the apparent representatives of wisdom, who, however, were proven to ignore their ignorance. Therefore, the knowledge of what is good arises as the result of the elenctic-philosophical procedure; it is not a systematised set of knowledge, but an endless effort of philosophical research and exercise of critical thought. By checking the content of the oracle, Socrates understands his presence as a mission validated by the god. His knowledge about the fact that the performance of an unjust deed and the disobedience to the dictates of the human or godly superior are evil and shameful derives from the philosophical exercise of his elenchus. Thus, he emerges as a

¹ τὸ γὰρ τοὶ θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναί ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν, 29a5-7.

² ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναί, 29b5-6.

³ τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα, 29b6-7.

model at two levels that interact: the cognitive one and the ethical one. The knowledge that defines human conduct and urges the production of good deeds can arise only as a result of the philosophical procedure; this kind of knowledge is responsible for the demonstration of temperate, just, pious and brave conduct. As a result, Socrates notes that one must show bravery towards those issues which are deemed good by the knowledge of the philosophical elenchus. And what is good is his godly mission referring to the exercise of philosophical examination to his fellow humans. He belittles the fact of death before the significance of the philosophical elenchus. Finally, connecting bravery with knowledge, he manages to correlate it with the other virtues; in this way, he indicates the unity of virtues and confirms the Socratic view expressed in the phrase “virtue is knowledge”.

Taking account of Socrates’ admissions in the first sections, as well as the aforementioned remarks, god is the holder of absolute wisdom. Socrates suggests that the godly ambassador among the humans is embodied in him: the one that can apply the godly plan of the awareness of human ignorance and the diligent exercise of the philosophical living with the aim of gradually conquering the knowledge of what is good. In this way, he implies that it is imperative that everyone adopts the principles and values he proposes as a model: namely, the observance and performance of the deeds befitting a just and good man.

Crito 43a-44b5

The dramatic place where the discussion unfolds in the Platonic *Crito* is the jail, while the dramatic time is a while before Socrates’ execution, which delays until the return of the sacred ship that has been sent to Delos. From the introductory scene of the dialogue, Socrates’ attitude towards death becomes apparent:

‘I have been surprised to see you so peacefully asleep. It was on purpose that I did not wake you, so that you should spend your time most agreeably. Often in the past throughout my life, I have considered the way you live happy, and especially so now that you bear your present misfortune so easily and lightly’. (Grube’s translation)¹

Death, which is undoubtedly evil for Crito, is an event with which Socrates deals with calmness, placidity, endurance and bravery. The Socratic placidity expresses the calm, fearless, patient acceptance of the current fate (παρούσα τύχη, 43c3).

The news of Socrates’ death sounds unpleasant in his fellows’ ears: soon, it will be disclosed that their fellow’s death is a practical (ἔργω) proof of the friends’ inability to provide help (benefit) to a friend. The representatives of the traditional aristocratic ethics ‘to help one’s friends and to harm one’s enemies’ (ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους καὶ βλάπτειν τοὺς ἐχθρούς), the most prominent among whom is Crito, are unable to act according to what they believe to be the appropriate model of action. However, the antithesis between the unpleasantness that Socrates’ fellows feel due to the news of his impending death and his calm attitude towards this fact preannounces the more specialised controversy that will follow between the aristocratic view ‘to help one’s friends and to harm one’s enemies’ (the inability to provide benefit equals shame) and the one that Socrates represents.

Under the light of this intense controversy that is starting to appear, Socrates, with the tool of his irony, defuses the negative content of Crito’s announcement, defining it as good fate:

‘May it be for the best. If it so please the gods, so be it’. (Grube’s translation)²

At first glance, one can detect the close parallelism between this passage and *Apology* 19a6-7:

¹ ἄλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἦγειρον ἴνα ὡς ἦδιστα διάγῃς. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ ἠὲ δαιμόνια τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστῶσιν συμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶτος φέρεις, 43b4-9.

² Ἄλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθῆ, εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω, 43d7-8.

'Even so, let the matter proceed as the god may wish, but I must obey the law and make my defense'. (Grube's translation)¹

The main quality that Socrates demonstrates is piety: he chooses the absolute submission and compliance with the godly will. He seems willing to accept whatever is dear to gods. Therefore, he recognises that gods have a superior regulatory authority, which can definitively affect what happens in the lives of humans. He shows practical (ἔργῳ) obedience to this authority, while he accepts the power of the godly dictates. The composure and endurance before death derive from the recognition of the superiority of the godly authority and its aforementioned nature (Socratic piety). If, for gods' wish to take place, it is necessary that Socrates dies, this can only be interpreted by him as good fate, namely as a fact that will finally prove to be beneficial and fruitful for him on the whole. The aforementioned remarks achieve the union of godly and good: every deed that is compliant with the godly will is good (beneficial) for its receiver. The idea that is spread out in the passage recalls *Apology* 41c9-d3 and the Socratic belief that gods take care of good men:

'And keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods'. (Grube's translation)²

The most powerful proof of the Socratic piety is the characterisation of the outcome approved by gods as benefit. If Socrates' death is compliant with the godly will, then it can only be beneficial to him.

The heroic presentation of Socrates starts from the firm belief he shows with regard to the delay of his execution. His certainty derives from the clear (ἐναργές, 44b5) interpretation he gives to the dream he saw, in which a beautiful woman, dressed in white, announces in Homeric verses his return to fertile Troy:

'She called me and said: "Socrates, may you arrive at fertile Phthia on the third day"'. (Grube's translation)³

The woman's words recall almost verbatim a part of Achilles' speech to the ambassadors chosen to carry Agamemnon's very generous offer:

'And if so be the great Shaker of the Earth grants me fair voyaging, on the third day shall I reach deep-soiled Phthia'. (Murray's translation)⁴

Retaining the parallelism, Socrates obviously considers as homeland the place where he will go after his execution. The passage expresses the idea that we find in *Apology* 40c5-10 that death may be two things: either complete lack of perception or relocation:

'Let us reflect in this way, too, that there is good hope that death is a blessing, for it is one of two things: either the dead are nothing and have no perception of anything, or it is, as we are told, a change and a relocating for the soul from here to another place'. (Grube's translation)⁵

However, the issue of the comparison of Socrates and Achilles and the assumption of heroic qualities by the former requires deeper analysis. In the *Apology*, from the comparison between Socrates and Achilles, we first detected their similarity with regard to the endurance before death, but, in the end, we highlighted the replacement of the heroic model of bravery, which is based on retribution, the cause of benefit to friends and damage to enemies, by the Socratic model, which promotes the just deed. But why does Plato reconnect

¹ ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

² καὶ ἐν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα.

³ καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο", 44b1-3.

⁴ εἰ δὲ κεν εὐπλοίην δῶη κλυτὸς Ἐννοσίγαιος/ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοίμην, *Iliad* 9.362-3.

⁵ Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῆ ψυχῆ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον.

these two models of values? The general framework remains the same: Socrates, both here and there, is before his impending death. The connection with the Homeric hero model that is achieved through the relevant text aims at the parallel presentation and comparison of the circumstances under which Achilles and Socrates act. Achilles speaks to the embassy (*Iliad* 9.307-429) that was sent to him in order to encourage him to return to battle. The tone of speaking is violent-sharp and strongly emotional. He expresses (315-36) his disappointment for the living of intense action from which he did not gain glory, but humiliation:

'Like portion hath he that abideth at home, and if one warreth his best, and one in honour are held both the coward and the brave; death cometh alike to the idle man and to him that worketh much'. (Murray's translation)¹

He renounces the proposed presents at a fit of anger (378-91); he generally excludes the struggle for the acquisition of heroic glory, promoting the value of life. We should compare these words of Achilles, with which he gives first priority to life, with those that we found in the *Apology* (cf. p.3). Due to Agamemnon's behaviour, Achilles seems disappointed by the heroic system of values, by traditional ethics. The temporary, yet not final or permanent, rejection of the traditional code of values by its principal representative reaches its peak through the rejection of the view that glory is more important than life:

'But if I return home to my dear native land, lost then is my glorious renown, yet shall my life long endure, neither shall the doom of death come soon upon me'. (Murray's translation)²

We should also highlight Achilles' piety, who stresses, at two points, that he will return to his homeland if gods allow it:

(a) *'And if so be the great Shaker of the Earth grants me fair voyaging, on the third day shall I reach deep-soiled Phthia'.* (Murray's translation)³

(b) *'For if the gods preserve me, and I reach my home'.* (Murray's translation)⁴

Achilles seems to accept the godly will as a superior regulatory authority, as Socrates does in *Crito* 43d7-8. However, the main question remains the following: why does Plato present Socrates citing this verse from Achilles' speech, during which the leading representative of the traditional ethics, the one that Achaeans admire, temporarily doubts his heroic role? Why doesn't he refer to Achilles' subsequent return to battle?

Apology-Crito: Conclusion

The conceptual and semantic background of Achilles' speech allows for a new attempt to interpret the Platonic selection of this verse. The presentation of the Homeric verse in a way that it gives a meaning to and explains the Socratic dream marks the transition from the Homeric model to the Socratic one. But in which way is Achilles presented as unreliable with regard to acting as a Homeric good man and disappointed by the system of values he represents? The double comparison between Socrates and Achilles in the *Apology* and the *Crito* enlightens the distance between the systems of values that they represent. In the *Apology*, Socrates and Achilles practically show bravery and endurance before death, serving their values; their difference is that the latter pursues the restoration of his friend's damaged honour, while the former embraces the just deed. However, in the *Crito*, Achilles appears displeased with the system of values that he serves, he doubts the outcome (ἔργον) that the action according to the particular system (λόγος) will bring about, while, at the same time, he doubts the system per se. Therefore, he breaks the unity that characterises the procedure during

¹ ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι/ ἐν δὲ ἰῆ τιμῆ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἦδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός/ κάτθαν' ὁμῶς ὅ τ' ἀεργὸς ἀνήρ ὅ τε πολλὰ ἐοργῶς, *Iliad* 9.318-20.

² εἰ δὲ κεν οἴκαδ' ἴκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,/ ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δὴρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν/ ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ' ὄκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχέη, *Iliad* 9.414-6. Cf. *Odyssey* 11.488-91.

³ εἰ δὲ κεν εὐπλοίην δῶη κλυτὸς Ἴννοσίγαιος/ ἦματι κεν τριτάτῳ Φθῆην ἐρίβωλον ἰκοίμην, *Iliad* 9.362-3. Cf. p.10.

⁴ ἦν γὰρ δὴ με σαῶσι θεοὶ καὶ οἴκαδ' ἴκωμαι, *Iliad* 9.393. Cf. 9.414.

which one acts according to his thoughts and words, the unity of words and deeds, and embraces the anti-heroic pursuit of life as the ultimate virtue. In fact, the piety that Achilles demonstrates is part of the total renouncement of the traditional code of values that is practically proven ineffective. On the other hand, Socrates appears as the unbroken model of the consistency of words and deeds, obeying and acting according to what 'reason' (λόγος) dictates. As he does in the *Apology*, in the *Crito* too, he expresses the qualities of the brave (patient before death), temperate and pious man with equal intensity. He remains faithful to the godly dictates: in the *Apology*, he is committed to the content of the Delphic oracle, namely the constant exercise of the philosophical living, while, in the *Crito*, he accepts death if it comes as a decision of the godly will. In the Homeric epic, Achilles will stay, return to battle and get killed. But, in the *Crito*, Plato enlightens the stage during which Achilles hesitates and doubts the model of life that he had been following until then. Under the light of this dispute, Achilles' return to his homeland would seal the abandonment of the heroic values (total rupture of the unity between words and deeds), disclosing their failure as a heroic model that guides human behaviour. Socrates' return to his homeland – which takes Orphic metaphysical extensions because, for Socrates, the return to homeland, according to the *Apology*, means the after-death relocation to a place where he will be able to continue to exercise the philosophic living – is going to validate his unobstructed faith to the principles he represents: it constitutes good fate as it is the application of the godly will and it involves the continuation of the exercise of the philosophical activity with which he reminds humans to take care of their soul. Therefore, the Platonic selection of this verse aims to highlight that, through the failure of the traditional values, which is expressed as a failure to provide a consistent, undoubted model of conduct, according to which someone's words and deeds are in absolute harmony, the Homeric hero takes off his heroic apparel; the Socratic model, which discloses with absolute consistency the faithful application of its ethical dictates, must now undertake the heroic veil and mantle. As a result, the citation of the Homeric verse prefaces the negation of the power of the traditional values and the incorporation of the heroic quality by Socrates. The discussion that will follow in the *Crito* will bring back the issues of the opinion of the many and the traditional ethics that is based on the idea 'to help one's friends and to harm one's enemies' (ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους καὶ βλάπτειν τοὺς ἐχθρούς), with the aim of completely rejecting them and not accepting them as fundamental criteria of human conduct. Plato's literary goal now becomes clear: to replace Achilles with Socrates. Achilles is the man admired by the Achaeans in terms of traditional virtue; Socrates becomes admired by the Athenians in terms of ethical, cooperative virtue. During the comparison of these two, the latter is superior, because he represents a more consistent, effective and beneficial model for the human: the just deed.

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**ВЗАИМОСВЯЗЬ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ МЫСЛИ
И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ИСТОРИИ (ДИСКУССИИ В ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННОЙ
ГОСУДАРСТВОВЕДЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЕ
ВТОРОЙ ПОЛОВИНЫ XIX – НАЧАЛА XX В.)**

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В статье дается всесторонний анализ взаимозависимости политической мысли и политической истории, существовавшей в дискуссии отечественной государственноведческой литературе второй половины XIX – начала XX в. Автор рассматривает работы ведущих российских ученых того времени, весьма активно и плодотворно обсуждавших эту тему на страницах своих произведений. Высказанные в то время идеи оказываются востребованными и современной научной мыслью, находящей в них немало ценных советов по современным текущим политическим событиям и научным теориям.

Ключевые слова: государство, власть, гражданское общество, история, политика, политология, право, собственность, личность

**THE INTERCONNECTION OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND POLITICAL HISTORY (DISCUSSIONS IN DOMESTIC
POLITICAL LITERATURE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XIX –
BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURIES)**

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The paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the interdependence of political thought and political history that existed in the national debate of political literature in the second half of the XIX – early XX century. The author considers the work of leading Russian scientists of that time, discuss this topic in the pages of his works very active and fruitful. Made while ideas are popular and modern scientific thought, finding in them a lot of valuable tips on contemporary political events and scientific theories.

Keywords: state authorities, civil society, history, politics, political science, law, property, personality

Проблема взаимодействия (или соотношения) социально-политических идей и концепций, с одной стороны, и конкретных социально-политических условий, обстоятельств, в которых появляются и развиваются эти идеи, с другой стороны, всегда была одной из важнейших, базовых в самых разных философско-политических учениях.

Примечательной в этом отношении является дискуссия, которая развернулась в отечественной государственноведческой литературе во второй половине XIX – начале XX в. Споры велись по поводу формулировок предмета истории философии права,