The purpose of this work is analyze the problem of transport communications at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In the first months after the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, hostilities unfolded on a big territory from the Barents Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. Under these conditions, the problem of supplying the existing armies, especially considering the fact that a huge amount of military equipment was involved in military operations, became one of the most important in achieving victory. Understanding this, the German command, in every way sought to capture, or, in extreme cases, cut the available transport routes. Considering that the railway transport was the most effective for supplying troops during this period, German military generals developed many military operations taking into account the location of the railway lines, which they tried to seize in every possible way. The front, in the first months of 1941, began to rapidly roll back from the western borders to the east and south, deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. In these regions, the network of available railway communications was much less common than in the west of the country. Under these conditions, the Soviet government makes decisions on the construction of a number of new railways in remote areas of the country, necessary for the normal supply of economic centers of the Volga region and the Urals, and taking into account the approach to these regions of the theater of military operations. The Astrakhan-Kizlyar railway, the construction decision of which was taken by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in August 1941, became one of such highways connecting, first of all, Stalingrad with transit routes on the Caspian Sea.
